Kent Bradley Wills - Iowa Appeal and Department of Corrections record

Discussion in '35mm Cameras' started by Greegor, Jan 10, 2008.

  1. Greegor

    Greegor Guest

    Kent Bradley Wills - Iowa Appeal and Department of Corrections record

    http://www.doc.state.ia.us/InmateInfo.asp?OffenderCd=1155768

    http://snipurl.com/felun

    Name Kent Bradley Wills
    Offender Number 1155768
    Sex M
    Birth Date 01/08/1969
    Age 39
    Location Interstate Compact
    Offense BURGLARY 2ND DEGREE
    County Of Commitment Polk
    Commitment Date 01/16/2004
    Duration
    TDD/SDD * 01/16/2009


    * TDD = Tentative Discharge Date
    * SDD = Supervision Discharge Date


    Supervision Status Offense Class County of Commitment End Date
    Probation Aggravated Misdemeanor Polk
    Probation C Felony Polk


    Supervision Status Offense Class County of Commitment End Date
    Probation Aggravated Misdemeanor Polk 11/25/2003


    Did you look at this Dan Sullivan?
    Did you send Kent a birthday card a few days ago, January 8th?


    http://tinyurl.com/2n229g


    http://64.233.167.104/search?q=cach...+wills+iowa+burglary&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=2&gl=us



    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA


    No. 31 / 04-0202


    Filed May 6, 2005


    STATE OF IOWA,


    Appellee,


    vs.


    KENT BRADLEY WILLS,


    Appellant.


    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Michael D.
    Huppert, Judge.


    Defendant appeals claiming ineffective assistance of
    counsel. AFFIRMED.


    Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Tricia Johnston,
    Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.


    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney
    General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and John Judisch,
    Assistant
    County Attorney, for appellee.


    WIGGINS, Justice.


    Kent Wills appeals his conviction for second-degree burglary
    contending that an attached garage is a separate occupied structure
    from that of the living quarters of the residence. In this appeal,
    we
    must determine whether trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing
    to move for judgment of acquittal on the basis there was insufficient
    evidence to convict Wills of second-degree burglary when he entered
    an
    attached garage of a residence when no persons were present in the
    garage, but when persons were present in the living quarters; and (2)
    failing to object to a jury instruction based on this same argument.
    Because we find there was no legal basis for the motion for judgment
    of acquittal or the objection to the jury instruction, Wills' trial
    counsel was not ineffective. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of
    the district court.


    I. Background Facts and Proceedings.


    Around 1 a.m., an Ankeny resident called the local police to report
    that a car alarm sounded in the resident's neighborhood. The city
    dispatched a police officer to the location. Observing nothing
    unusual, the officer left the area, only to be stopped a couple of
    blocks later by a person who informed the officer he had witnessed
    someone running from the area of the car alarm. As the officer
    started driving back to the area of the car alarm, he noticed a
    person
    walking on the sidewalk. The officer asked the person, a minor, if
    he
    had noticed anybody running from the area. The minor answered that
    he
    had not. While the officer and another officer were speaking to the
    minor, another resident of the neighborhood arrived in her car and
    informed the officers that she had observed two people, one of whom
    was heavy set with a blinking light on his back pocket, walking in
    the
    area of her neighbor's residence. She observed the heavier-set
    individual, later identified as Wills, enter her neighbor's attached
    garage through an unlocked service door. She further observed a
    smaller individual standing by a van parked in the neighbor's
    driveway.


    The officers eventually let the minor leave even though they found a
    large amount of coins, a flashlight, and an electronic pocket
    organizer in his pockets. After releasing the minor, the police
    officers drove to the residence where the neighbor observed the two
    suspicious people and woke the owner. The owner, his wife, and two
    daughters were in the residence sleeping at the time. After a search
    of his vehicles, the owner discovered change and an electronic pocket
    organizer were missing from the vehicles. The owner's daughter
    reported a diamond ring and some change were missing from her
    vehicle. The officers then contacted the minor's parents, who
    informed the officers the minor was with Wills. After the officers
    questioned the minor again, he admitted his involvement in the theft
    and implicated Wills in the burglary. Although Wills denied
    involvement in the burglary, the officers arrested him.


    The State filed a trial information charging Wills with second-degree
    burglary. The State later amended the information to include two
    additional charges of burglary in the third degree and using a
    juvenile to commit an indictable offense.


    The jury returned a verdict finding Wills guilty of the crimes of
    burglary in the second degree, burglary in the third degree, and
    using
    a juvenile to commit an indictable offense. Wills appeals his
    conviction for second-degree burglary claiming ineffective assistance
    of counsel.


    II. Scope of Review.


    Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are derived from the
    Sixth
    Amendment of the United States Constitution. Strickland v.
    Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-86, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063-64, 80 L. Ed.
    2d 674, 691-93 (1984). Our review for a claim involving violations
    of
    the Constitution is de novo. State v. Fintel, 689 N.W.2d 95, 100
    (Iowa 2004). We normally preserve ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
    claims for postconviction relief actions. State v. Carter, 602 N.W.
    2d
    818, 820 (Iowa 1999). However, we will address such claims on direct
    appeal when the record is sufficient to permit a ruling. State v.
    Artzer, 609 N.W.2d 526, 531 (Iowa 2000). The appellate record in the
    present case is sufficient to allow us to address Wills' ineffective-
    assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal.


    In order for a defendant to succeed on a claim of ineffective
    assistance of counsel, the defendant must prove: (1) counsel failed
    to perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted. Id.
    Prejudice results when "there is a reasonable probability that, but
    for the counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
    would have been different." State v. Hopkins, 576 N.W.2d 374, 378
    (Iowa 1998) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068,
    80 L. Ed. 2d at 698). Wills' arguments also raise issues of
    statutory
    interpretation, which we review for correction of errors at law.
    State v. Wolford Corp., 689 N.W.2d 471, 473 (Iowa 2004).


    III. Analysis.


    To find Wills guilty of burglary in the second degree, the State had
    to prove Wills perpetrated a burglary "in or upon an occupied
    structure in which one or more persons are present . . . ." Iowa
    Code
    § 713.5(2) (2003) (emphasis added).


    In this appeal, Wills first contends his trial counsel was
    ineffective
    for failing to move for a judgment of acquittal on the basis there
    was
    insufficient evidence to support a finding that at the time Wills
    entered the garage, there were persons present in or upon the
    occupied
    structure. Wills concedes the garage was an occupied structure, but
    argues the living quarters and the attached garage are separate and
    independent occupied structures; therefore, the jury could not have
    found there were people present in the attached garage at the time of
    the burglary.


    The Code defines an "occupied structure" as:


    [A]ny building, structure, appurtenances to buildings and structures,
    land, water or air vehicle, or similar place adapted for overnight
    accommodation of persons, or occupied by persons for the purpose of
    carrying on business or other activity therein, or for the storage or
    safekeeping of anything of value. Such a structure is an "occupied
    structure" whether or not a person is actually present.


    Id. § 702.12.


    Wills relies on State v. Smothers, 590 N.W.2d 721 (Iowa 1999), to
    argue the garage and the living quarters are separate and independent
    occupied structures. In Smothers, two separate and distinct
    businesses connected by interior fire doors were operated in the same
    structure. 590 N.W.2d at 723. We held the defendant committed two
    burglaries by entering each business because "[t]he facility's
    construction history and physical make-up demonstrate that the
    portions are independent working units which constitute '[a]
    combination of materials to form a construction for occupancy [or]
    use.'" Id. Smothers is not at odds with the present case because the
    living quarters and the garage are not separate or independent units
    of the residence.


    Our review of the record reveals the garage in question was a three-
    car attached garage separated from the living quarters by a door.
    The
    same roof covered the garage as the rest of the residence. The
    living
    quarters surrounded the garage on two sides. It was structurally no
    different from any other room in the residence.


    The garage was a functional part of the residence. On the night of
    the incident, the door was unlocked. The owner of the residence used
    two stalls in the garage to park the family vehicles. The owner used
    the third stall for his motorcycle. As such, the garage and the
    living quarters are a single "structure" or "building" functioning as
    an integral part of the family residence. Thus, the residence
    including the garage is a single "occupied structure" under section
    702.12. See, e.g., People v. Ingram, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 256 (Ct. App.
    1995) (holding defendant's entry into an attached garage constituted
    first-degree burglary because the garage was attached to the house;
    therefore, burglary of the garage was burglary of an inhabited
    dwelling house); People v. Cunningham, 637 N.E.2d 1247, 1252 (Ill.
    App. Ct. 1994) (holding "ordinarily an attached garage is a
    'dwelling'
    because it is part of the structure in which the owner or occupant
    lives"); State v. Lara, 587 P.2d 52, 53 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978) (holding
    "burglary of the [attached] garage was burglary of the dwelling house
    because the garage was a part of the structure used as living
    quarters"); People v. Green, 141 A.D.2d 760, 761 (N.Y. App. Div.
    1988)
    (holding "ince the garage in the present case was structurally
    part
    of a building which was used for overnight lodging of various
    persons,
    it must be considered as part of a dwelling"); White v. State, 630
    S.W.
    2d 340, 342 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (holding an attached garage under
    the
    same roof as the home would be considered a habitation within the
    purview of the penal code because the garage is a structure
    appurtenant to and connected to the house); State v. Murbach, 843 P.
    2d
    551, 553 (Wash. Ct. App 1993) (holding the definition of a dwelling
    under Washington's burglary statute included an attached garage).


    Had Wills' trial counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal on the
    basis there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that at
    the
    time Wills entered the garage there were no persons present in or
    upon
    the occupied structure, it would have been overruled by the court
    because the owner and his family were present in the residence at the
    time of the burglary.


    Wills also claims his counsel was ineffective for failing to object
    to
    the jury instruction used by the district court on the same ground;
    that the living quarters were a separate and independent occupied
    structure from the attached garage. The instruction as given stated:


    The State must prove all of the following elements of Burglary in the
    Second Degree as to Count I:


    1. On or about the 12th day of August, 2003, the defendant or
    someone
    he aided and abetted broke into or entered the residence at . . . .


    2. The residence at . . . was an occupied structure as defined in
    Instruction No. 29.


    3. The defendant or the person he aided and abetted did not have
    permission or authority to break into the residence at . . . .


    4. The defendant or the person he aided and abetted did so with the
    specific intent to commit a theft therein.


    5. During the incident persons were present in or upon the occupied
    structure.


    If the State has proved all of the elements, the defendant is guilty
    of Burglary in the Second Degree. If the State has failed to prove
    any of the elements, the defendant is not guilty of Burglary in the
    Second Degree and you will then consider the charge of Attempted
    Burglary in the Second Degree explained in Instruction No. 21.


    (Emphasis added.)


    Wills' claim is without merit. As we have discussed, the residence
    is
    the one and only "occupied structure" under the facts of this case.
    Had Wills' trial counsel made this objection to the instruction, it
    would have been overruled.


    Therefore, Wills' trial counsel is not ineffective for failing to
    move
    for a judgment of acquittal or objecting to the instruction because
    there was no legal basis for the motion or objection. See State v.
    Hochmuth, 585 N.W.2d 234, 238 (Iowa 1998) (holding trial counsel was
    not ineffective for failing to raise an issue that has no merit).


    IV. Disposition.


    We affirm the judgment of the district court because Wills' trial
    counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise meritless issues.


    AFFIRMED.
     
    Greegor, Jan 10, 2008
    #1
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  2. Greegor

    Kent Wills Guest


    So you're of the opinion that if you post something enough
    times, it becomes truth, huh?
    How's that worked for you in the past?


    --
    Kent
    Do not meddle in the affairs of Dragons...
    for thou art crunchy and taste good with ketchup.


     
    Kent Wills, Jan 11, 2008
    #2
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  3. Greegor

    Greegor Guest

    Kent Bradley Wills - Iowa Appeal and Department of Corrections record

    KW > So you're of the opinion that if you post
    KW > something enough times, it becomes truth, huh?
    KW > How's that worked for you in the past?

    Are you pretending that the Iowa state court docket,
    Iowa Supreme Court, and the Iowa Department of
    Corrections all lied too, Kent?

    http://www.doc.state.ia.us/InmateInfo.asp?OffenderCd=1155768

    http://snipurl.com/felun
     
    Greegor, Jan 12, 2008
    #3
  4. Greegor

    Kent Wills Guest

    Good boy.
    I ordered you to post it five more times, and you're well on
    your way to following said order without question.
    I have you trained far better than I thought.
    Here's a puppy treat for you.
     
    Kent Wills, Jan 12, 2008
    #4
  5. Greegor

    Greegor Guest

    KW > So you're of the opinion that if you post
    KW > something enough times, it becomes truth, huh?
    KW > How's that worked for you in the past?

    Pretty good when it's authoritative like the Iowa Supreme Court!


    http://www.doc.state.ia.us/InmateInfo.asp?OffenderCd=1155768
    http://snipurl.com/felun
    Name Kent Bradley Wills
    Offender Number 1155768
    Sex M
    Birth Date 01/08/1969
    Age 39
    Location Interstate Compact
    Offense BURGLARY 2ND DEGREE
    County Of Commitment Polk
    Commitment Date 01/16/2004
    Duration
    TDD/SDD * 01/16/2009
    * TDD = Tentative Discharge Date
    * SDD = Supervision Discharge Date
    Supervision Status Offense Class County of Commitment End Date
    Probation  Aggravated Misdemeanor  Polk
    Probation  C Felony  Polk
    Supervision Status Offense Class County of Commitment End Date
    Probation  Aggravated Misdemeanor  Polk  11/25/2003
    Did you look at this Dan Sullivan?
    Did you send Kent a birthday card a few days ago, January 8th?

    http://tinyurl.com/2n229g

    http://64.233.167.104/search?q=cache:6mvDMR00ZsQJ:caselaw.findlaw.com...

    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
     
    Greegor, Jan 13, 2008
    #5
  6. Greegor

    Greegor Guest

    KW > So you're of the opinion that if you post
    KW > something enough times, it becomes truth, huh?
    KW > How's that worked for you in the past?

    G > Are you pretending that the Iowa state court
    G > docket, Iowa Supreme Court, and the Iowa
    G > Department of Corrections all lied too, Kent?

    KW > Good boy.
    KW > I ordered you to post it five more times,
    KW > and you're well on your way to following
    KW > said order without question.
    KW > I have you trained far better than I thought.
    KW > Here's a puppy treat for you.

    How's that reverse logic working out for you?


    Kent Bradley Wills - Iowa Appeal and Department of Corrections record

    http://www.doc.state.ia.us/InmateInfo.asp?OffenderCd=1155768

    http://snipurl.com/felun

    Name Kent Bradley Wills
    Offender Number 1155768
    Sex M
    Birth Date 01/08/1969
    Age 39
    Location Interstate Compact
    Offense BURGLARY 2ND DEGREE
    County Of Commitment Polk
    Commitment Date 01/16/2004
    Duration
    TDD/SDD * 01/16/2009
    * TDD = Tentative Discharge Date
    * SDD = Supervision Discharge Date

    Supervision Status Offense Class County of Commitment End Date
    Probation Aggravated Misdemeanor Polk
    Probation C Felony Polk

    Supervision Status Offense Class County of Commitment End Date
    Probation Aggravated Misdemeanor Polk 11/25/2003

    http://tinyurl.com/2n229g

    http://64.233.167.104/search?q=cach...+wills+iowa+burglary&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=2&gl=us

    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
    No. 31 / 04-0202
    Filed May 6, 2005
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Appellee,
    vs.
    KENT BRADLEY WILLS,
    Appellant.
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Michael D.
    Huppert, Judge.

    Defendant appeals claiming ineffective assistance of
    counsel. AFFIRMED.

    Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Tricia Johnston,
    Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.

    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney
    General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and John Judisch,
    Assistant
    County Attorney, for appellee.

    WIGGINS, Justice.

    Kent Wills appeals his conviction for second-degree burglary
    contending that an attached garage is a separate occupied structure
    from that of the living quarters of the residence. In this appeal,
    we
    must determine whether trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing
    to move for judgment of acquittal on the basis there was insufficient
    evidence to convict Wills of second-degree burglary when he entered
    an
    attached garage of a residence when no persons were present in the
    garage, but when persons were present in the living quarters; and (2)
    failing to object to a jury instruction based on this same argument.
    Because we find there was no legal basis for the motion for judgment
    of acquittal or the objection to the jury instruction, Wills' trial
    counsel was not ineffective. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of
    the district court.

    I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

    Around 1 a.m., an Ankeny resident called the local police to report
    that a car alarm sounded in the resident's neighborhood. The city
    dispatched a police officer to the location. Observing nothing
    unusual, the officer left the area, only to be stopped a couple of
    blocks later by a person who informed the officer he had witnessed
    someone running from the area of the car alarm. As the officer
    started driving back to the area of the car alarm, he noticed a
    person
    walking on the sidewalk. The officer asked the person, a minor, if
    he
    had noticed anybody running from the area. The minor answered that
    he
    had not. While the officer and another officer were speaking to the
    minor, another resident of the neighborhood arrived in her car and
    informed the officers that she had observed two people, one of whom
    was heavy set with a blinking light on his back pocket, walking in
    the
    area of her neighbor's residence. She observed the heavier-set
    individual, later identified as Wills, enter her neighbor's attached
    garage through an unlocked service door. She further observed a
    smaller individual standing by a van parked in the neighbor's
    driveway.

    The officers eventually let the minor leave even though they found a
    large amount of coins, a flashlight, and an electronic pocket
    organizer in his pockets. After releasing the minor, the police
    officers drove to the residence where the neighbor observed the two
    suspicious people and woke the owner. The owner, his wife, and two
    daughters were in the residence sleeping at the time. After a search
    of his vehicles, the owner discovered change and an electronic pocket
    organizer were missing from the vehicles. The owner's daughter
    reported a diamond ring and some change were missing from her
    vehicle. The officers then contacted the minor's parents, who
    informed the officers the minor was with Wills. After the officers
    questioned the minor again, he admitted his involvement in the theft
    and implicated Wills in the burglary. Although Wills denied
    involvement in the burglary, the officers arrested him.

    The State filed a trial information charging Wills with second-degree
    burglary. The State later amended the information to include two
    additional charges of burglary in the third degree and using a
    juvenile to commit an indictable offense.

    The jury returned a verdict finding Wills guilty of the crimes of
    burglary in the second degree, burglary in the third degree, and
    using
    a juvenile to commit an indictable offense. Wills appeals his
    conviction for second-degree burglary claiming ineffective assistance
    of counsel.

    II. Scope of Review.

    Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are derived from the
    Sixth
    Amendment of the United States Constitution. Strickland v.
    Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-86, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063-64, 80 L. Ed.
    2d 674, 691-93 (1984). Our review for a claim involving violations
    of
    the Constitution is de novo. State v. Fintel, 689 N.W.2d 95, 100
    (Iowa 2004). We normally preserve ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
    claims for postconviction relief actions. State v. Carter, 602 N.W.
    2d
    818, 820 (Iowa 1999). However, we will address such claims on direct
    appeal when the record is sufficient to permit a ruling. State v.
    Artzer, 609 N.W.2d 526, 531 (Iowa 2000). The appellate record in the
    present case is sufficient to allow us to address Wills' ineffective-
    assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal.

    In order for a defendant to succeed on a claim of ineffective
    assistance of counsel, the defendant must prove: (1) counsel failed
    to perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted. Id.
    Prejudice results when "there is a reasonable probability that, but
    for the counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
    would have been different." State v. Hopkins, 576 N.W.2d 374, 378
    (Iowa 1998) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068,
    80 L. Ed. 2d at 698). Wills' arguments also raise issues of
    statutory
    interpretation, which we review for correction of errors at law.
    State v. Wolford Corp., 689 N.W.2d 471, 473 (Iowa 2004).

    III. Analysis.

    To find Wills guilty of burglary in the second degree, the State had
    to prove Wills perpetrated a burglary "in or upon an occupied
    structure in which one or more persons are present . . . ." Iowa
    Code
    § 713.5(2) (2003) (emphasis added).

    In this appeal, Wills first contends his trial counsel was
    ineffective
    for failing to move for a judgment of acquittal on the basis there
    was
    insufficient evidence to support a finding that at the time Wills
    entered the garage, there were persons present in or upon the
    occupied
    structure. Wills concedes the garage was an occupied structure, but
    argues the living quarters and the attached garage are separate and
    independent occupied structures; therefore, the jury could not have
    found there were people present in the attached garage at the time of
    the burglary.

    The Code defines an "occupied structure" as:

    [A]ny building, structure, appurtenances to buildings and structures,
    land, water or air vehicle, or similar place adapted for overnight
    accommodation of persons, or occupied by persons for the purpose of
    carrying on business or other activity therein, or for the storage or
    safekeeping of anything of value. Such a structure is an "occupied
    structure" whether or not a person is actually present.

    Id. § 702.12.

    Wills relies on State v. Smothers, 590 N.W.2d 721 (Iowa 1999), to
    argue the garage and the living quarters are separate and independent
    occupied structures. In Smothers, two separate and distinct
    businesses connected by interior fire doors were operated in the same
    structure. 590 N.W.2d at 723. We held the defendant committed two
    burglaries by entering each business because "[t]he facility's
    construction history and physical make-up demonstrate that the
    portions are independent working units which constitute '[a]
    combination of materials to form a construction for occupancy [or]
    use.'" Id. Smothers is not at odds with the present case because the
    living quarters and the garage are not separate or independent units
    of the residence.

    Our review of the record reveals the garage in question was a three-
    car attached garage separated from the living quarters by a door.
    The
    same roof covered the garage as the rest of the residence. The
    living
    quarters surrounded the garage on two sides. It was structurally no
    different from any other room in the residence.

    The garage was a functional part of the residence. On the night of
    the incident, the door was unlocked. The owner of the residence used
    two stalls in the garage to park the family vehicles. The owner used
    the third stall for his motorcycle. As such, the garage and the
    living quarters are a single "structure" or "building" functioning as
    an integral part of the family residence. Thus, the residence
    including the garage is a single "occupied structure" under section
    702.12. See, e.g., People v. Ingram, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 256 (Ct. App.
    1995) (holding defendant's entry into an attached garage constituted
    first-degree burglary because the garage was attached to the house;
    therefore, burglary of the garage was burglary of an inhabited
    dwelling house); People v. Cunningham, 637 N.E.2d 1247, 1252 (Ill.
    App. Ct. 1994) (holding "ordinarily an attached garage is a
    'dwelling'
    because it is part of the structure in which the owner or occupant
    lives"); State v. Lara, 587 P.2d 52, 53 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978) (holding
    "burglary of the [attached] garage was burglary of the dwelling house
    because the garage was a part of the structure used as living
    quarters"); People v. Green, 141 A.D.2d 760, 761 (N.Y. App. Div.
    1988)
    (holding "ince the garage in the present case was structurally
    part
    of a building which was used for overnight lodging of various
    persons,
    it must be considered as part of a dwelling"); White v. State, 630
    S.W.
    2d 340, 342 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (holding an attached garage under
    the
    same roof as the home would be considered a habitation within the
    purview of the penal code because the garage is a structure
    appurtenant to and connected to the house); State v. Murbach, 843 P.
    2d
    551, 553 (Wash. Ct. App 1993) (holding the definition of a dwelling
    under Washington's burglary statute included an attached garage).

    Had Wills' trial counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal on the
    basis there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that at
    the
    time Wills entered the garage there were no persons present in or
    upon
    the occupied structure, it would have been overruled by the court
    because the owner and his family were present in the residence at the
    time of the burglary.

    Wills also claims his counsel was ineffective for failing to object
    to
    the jury instruction used by the district court on the same ground;
    that the living quarters were a separate and independent occupied
    structure from the attached garage. The instruction as given stated:

    The State must prove all of the following elements of Burglary in the
    Second Degree as to Count I:

    1. On or about the 12th day of August, 2003, the defendant or
    someone
    he aided and abetted broke into or entered the residence at . . . .

    2. The residence at . . . was an occupied structure as defined in
    Instruction No. 29.

    3. The defendant or the person he aided and abetted did not have
    permission or authority to break into the residence at . . . .

    4. The defendant or the person he aided and abetted did so with the
    specific intent to commit a theft therein.

    5. During the incident persons were present in or upon the occupied
    structure.

    If the State has proved all of the elements, the defendant is guilty
    of Burglary in the Second Degree. If the State has failed to prove
    any of the elements, the defendant is not guilty of Burglary in the
    Second Degree and you will then consider the charge of Attempted
    Burglary in the Second Degree explained in Instruction No. 21.

    (Emphasis added.)

    Wills' claim is without merit. As we have discussed, the residence
    is
    the one and only "occupied structure" under the facts of this case.
    Had Wills' trial counsel made this objection to the instruction, it
    would have been overruled.

    Therefore, Wills' trial counsel is not ineffective for failing to
    move
    for a judgment of acquittal or objecting to the instruction because
    there was no legal basis for the motion or objection. See State v.
    Hochmuth, 585 N.W.2d 234, 238 (Iowa 1998) (holding trial counsel was
    not ineffective for failing to raise an issue that has no merit).

    IV. Disposition.

    We affirm the judgment of the district court because Wills' trial
    counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise meritless issues.

    AFFIRMED.
     
    Greegor, Jan 13, 2008
    #6
  7. Greegor

    Kent Wills Guest

    So it's not worked huh? This would explain why you didn't
    bother trying to file your k00k s00t against the state of Iowa before
    the SoL expired.
    Probably the smartest thing you've ever done in your life.

    BTW, you have yet to prove the person named on the site is me.
    Any particular reason you've run away from that challenge?


    --
    Kent
    Do not meddle in the affairs of Dragons...
    for thou art crunchy and taste good with ketchup.






     
    Kent Wills, Jan 14, 2008
    #7
  8. Greegor

    Greegor Guest

    KW > So you're of the opinion that if you post
    KW > something enough times, it becomes truth, huh?
    KW > How's that worked for you in the past?

    G >Pretty good when it's authoritative like the Iowa Supreme Court!

    KW > So it's not worked huh?

    Might I suggest a good dose of electro shock therapy?

    KW > This would explain why you didn't bother
    KW > trying to file your k00k s00t against the
    KW > state of Iowa before the SoL expired.
    KW > Probably the smartest thing you've
    KW > ever done in your life.

    KW > BTW, you have yet to prove the person
    KW > named on the site is me.
    KW > Any particular reason you've
    KW > run away from that challenge?

    It's not much of a challenge.

    You said you planted false information
    because of your ""stalker"".

    Why did you publicly claim the Jan 8th birthday
    then later deny you're the Kent Wills born Jan 8th?

    That "coincidental" story was pretty funny.

    http://groups.google.com/group/alt.fan.bob-larson/msg/b66a032a903de6fc

    http://groups.google.com/group/alt.fan.bob-larson/msg/b66a032a903de6fc?dmode=source

    713. Kent Wills Mar 5 2005, 6:30 am
    Newsgroups: alt.fan.bob-larson, alt.true-crime, boulder.general,
    misc.legal
    From: Kent Wills <>
    Date: Sat, 05 Mar 2005 12:30:27 GMT Local: Sat, Mar 5 2005 6:30 am
    Subject: Re: Ted Kaldis and Carey v. Piphus

    < big snip! >

    You are often wrong. This will prove to be another example when
    Cameron is found guilty of an included lesser charge. I still don't
    see Capital Murder as realistic at this point. Of course, juries are
    a gamble.
    Here's an example:

    Last summer I watched a burglary trial (I have a lot of free time in
    the summers). The evidence presented made me suspect the guy
    probably
    did break into the victim's garage with the intent to steal
    something.
    I had reasonable doubt, however.

    One witness stated she was able to identify the defendant because he
    was wearing the same clothing during the ID as he was when she saw
    him
    enter the garage. A white T-shirt, and jeans.

    I thought it was odd that someone intent on committing a burglary at
    roughly 2:00AM would wear white, but he may not have been the
    brightest burglar on earth. He also had at least one flashing light
    (the kind used on bicycles) attached to his clothing. Seemed to me
    this guy *wanted* to be seen. He stated later that he did want to be
    seen so that any cars wouldn't hit him, and anyone who was awake
    wouldn't be worried that he was up to no good, since he was drawing
    attention to himself.

    The alleged accomplice claimed the defendant was wearing black at the
    time and changed into a white shirt later, before the police got him.

    Clearly one of them was, at best, in error, meaning the whole of
    their
    testimony should be disregarded as unreliable. If I could tell which
    (the defendant took the stand and stated he never changed clothing,
    so
    it may have been the accomplice and he probably got a deal, and had
    motivation to lie a bit), I would have disregarded it.

    Since I didn't KNOW, I had reasonable doubt. I would have said not
    guilty. I wasn't on the jury though, and they came back with a
    guilty
    verdict.

    So, Ted, even when you or I, or anyone else, believe a
    defendant
    SHOULD be found not guilty because of reasonable doubt, you can never
    tell with a jury. That's life in the big city.

    Kent
     
    Greegor, Jan 14, 2008
    #8
  9. Greegor

    Kent Wills Guest

    If I were using it, I could tell you. As it stands, I'm
    forcing you to prove how well trained you are.
    Here's a puppy treat for you.


    --
    Kent
    Do not meddle in the affairs of Dragons...
    for thou art crunchy and taste good with ketchup.

     
    Kent Wills, Jan 15, 2008
    #9
  10. Greegor

    Kent Wills Guest

    Do you think you need it?
    Then why do you consistently change the subject and try to
    hide from the posts?
    Yes. And?
    When have I made such a claim?
    The simple fact is, you don't know when I was born.
    Really?
    Where's the coincidence?
     
    Kent Wills, Jan 15, 2008
    #10
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